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Raúl Prebisch and the 
dilemma of development 
in the globalised world
Aldo Ferrer
G lobalization poses both challenges and opportunities. Prebisch 
confronted this development dilemma in the global world and left three 
messages which form the great legacy of his work. Firstly, central 
countries form visions of the world order that serve their own interests; 
and peripheral countries need to rebel against this theoretical framework 
to resolve the dilemma. Secondly, it is possible to transform reality and 
achieve a symmetrical non-subordinate relationship with the world’s power 
centres. Thirdly, the transformation requires a fundamental change in 
productive structures to incorporate knowledge into economic and social 
activity, since this is the fundamental instrument of development. These 











University of Buenos Aires
✒ aldoferrer@ymail.com
8RAúL PREbISCh And ThE dILEmmA of dEVELoPmEnT In ThE GLobALISEd WoRLd  •  ALdo fERRER
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 0
  This paper is based on the lecture given by the author at the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Santiago, Chile, 22 April 2010), on the occasion of the Ninth 
Raúl Prebisch Memorial Lecture.
1 The author of this essay has drawn extensively on his previous 
works: Ferrer (1996, 1997, 1998, 2004 and 2008, the latter referring 
to the fourth edition of La Economía Argentina (2008), on which 
M. Rougier collaborated.
In his analysis of  development problems in Latin 
America, Raúl Prebisch always related the domestic 
conditions of the region’s countries to their international 
context, and short-term instability to structural 
vulnerability in the longer term. His key concern 
was how to strengthen our capacity to respond 
to the challenges and opportunities of  the world 
economy, which nowadays we call globalization. That 
approach to reality gave rise to his contributions on 
the centre-periphery approach, the terms of trade, 
industrialization, regional integration, income 
distribution and appropriate public policies.
The world system is currently facing a number 
of unresolved problems. The first of these consist of 
asymmetries in levels of well-being which stem from 
an unequal distribution of  the fruits of  technical 
progress between and within countries. The “historical” 
problems of globalization have now been transcended 
by the great financial crisis and its repercussions 
on the real economy. Three key issues arise in this 
scenario: firstly, the inviability of an unregulated global 
financial system based on speculation; secondly, the 
impossibility of continuing to use the external deficit 
of the United States to bridge the saving-investment 
gap, thirdly, the emergence of large Asian nations as 
key players in international relations. 
The crisis has triggered transformations in the 
world system, causing changes to a number of its 
behaviour patterns. Nonetheless, the essential features 
of globalization remain, along with its links to the 
development of  national economies. The ongoing 
changes cannot be expected to inaugurate a lengthy 
phase of relative stability in international relations, 
without addressing the consequences of  extreme 
inequalities in well-being and resolving the most 
urgent environmental problems. 
This essay seeks to identify the nature and scope 
of the ongoing global changes and their repercussions 
on the countries of the region. It considers how much 
the world order and Latin American development 
problems have changed between Prebisch’s times 
and today, and, consequently, the extent to which 
his ideas and, in a broader sense, contributions of 
Latin America structuralist thinking based on his 
work and the contributions made by Celso Furtado, 
Aníbal Pinto and Osvaldo Sunkel, among others, 
remain relevant. 
For that purpose, the second section of  this 
paper outlines the main messages of Raúl Prebisch 
on the development dilemma, while the third relates 
the scope of this dilemma to its historical context: 
globalization. The paper continues with a fourth 
section that aims to synthesize the key aspects of the 
last quarter-century of economic history, as a basis 
for arguing in favour of the continued relevance of 
Prebisch’s ideas today. Lastly, the concluding section 
discusses the importance of national density in the 
development process, which I consider crucial for 
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The global world poses challenges and opportunities 
—threats but also new prospects. This was essentially 
Prebisch’ belief throughout his life. From his youth until 
his final days, he approached this fundamental issue 
of the dilemma of development in the global world, 
formulating a set of ideas that enriched our country’ 
heritage. But, most importantly, he left three messages 
which, are definitely the major legacy of his work.
The first is that the central countries form visions 
of  the world order that serve their own interests. 
Consequently, we need to rebel against this theoretical 
scheme to resolve the problem of development and 
respond effectively to the challenges of  growth 
in a globalised world. Prebisch referred to that 
rationalization of the international system as “centrist 
thought”, which —from the theory of  comparative 
advantages of the classical doctrine of international 
trade until the theory of rational expectations— has 
always served the interests of  the centre. The same 
is true of  economic policy, from free trade through 
to the Washington Consensus. These are ideological 
formulations of the developed centre, which conceive 
a systemic organization in which peripheral countries 
are merely segments of the world market rather than 
national systems capable of forming strategies, within 
their borders and integrated into a globalised world, 
to deploy their economic and social development 
potential and incorporate scientific and technological 
progress. This is Prebisch’s first message: Rebellion 
against centrist thought.
The second is that transformation is possible; that, 
based on a realistic view of problems, it is possible 
to change reality, deploy potential and achieve a 
symmetric and non-subordinate relationship with 
the rest of the world —first and foremost with the 
centres of world power. 
Prebisch’s third message is that the transformation 
requires a far-reaching change in the productive 
structure to incorporate knowledge as a fundamental 
tool of development, in economic and social activity. 
This is only possible in a diversified and complex 
structure, and cannot occur in a country that 
specializes in exploiting natural resources without 
simultaneously deploying a complex web of industries 
and value-added chains operating at the frontier of 
knowledge. Once that is done it is possible to create 
employment, well-being, social inclusion, and a 
symmetric non-subordinate relationship with the 
international system. 
These are Prebisch’s three great messages. The 
question now, 25 years after his passing, is what 
relevance they still have in relation to the proposals of 
the Executive Secretariat of eclac. In an attempt to 
give an answer to this, I will briefly draw your attention 
to the core issue in Prebisch’s thinking, namely the 
dilemma of development in a global system.
II
The messages of Prebisch’s work
III
The dilemma and its history
Globalization is the first component of the dilemma: 
it constitutes a system of financial and trade networks, 
and integration of value chains, which have grown 
deeper through time under the effects of scientific and 
technological progress. Globalization coexists with 
the fact that countries’ domestic markets remain the 
fundamental space for transactions and economic and 
social activity. Not much more than 20% of global 
production crosses national borders; and investments 
by the subsidiaries of  transnational corporations 
account for no more than 15% of  global capital 
formation. Accordingly, domestic markets and saving 
constitute the main components of the demand for 
capital accumulation and its financing. 
Globalization is also a power system, in which the 
large States collaborate with transnational corporations 
and financial markets to exert a dominant influence 
and establish the systemic rules of the game. Lastly, 
as Prebisch argued in his first message, globalization 
is the space in which hegemonic thought, functional 
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to the interests of the centre, is formed. Hence the 
idea that the market is capable of rationally managing 
resources globally for the benefit of all, and that the 
forces of globalization are so overwhelming that any 
attempt to construct national development projects 
on the periphery is doomed to failure. 
The second component of  the dilemma is 
development, which consists of managing knowledge 
and incorporating it into the economic and social fabric. 
This is a cumulative process that unfolds through time. 
Not only does it include capital and technology, but 
it also involves simultaneously, organization of the 
State, education, public and private synergy, and the 
formation of national science and technology systems. 
It is a process of continuous accumulation of productive 
know-how and capacity through time. Development 
always takes place in the national space. To quote 
Professor Sunkel, the only possible development is 
development from within (Sunkel, 1991). Development 
cannot be imported. There is no case in world economic 
history in which a country has been developed from 
outside. Development is always a process that occurs 
in a national space, or not at all. When this happens, 
it is possible to exploit one’s potential and attain the 
development frontiers of each era.
The fact that globalization penetrates into 
countries, and development always occurs in a 
national space, raises the dilemma of development 
in a global order. This national space is penetrated, 
from outside, by a division of labour decided upon 
by those who produce and dominate trade networks. 
It can penetrate the control of natural resources in 
less advanced countries and does so by dominating 
value chains through large corporations, and their 
influence on the process of  knowledge-generation 
and application of technology. The relation between 
globalization and knowledge in particular is a fertile 
are of Latin American thinking on technology policy. 
Here I would call to mind Professor Jorge A. Sábato, 
former technology manager of Argentina’s National 
Atomic Energy Commission, who, in various forums 
has repeatedly argued that the problem consists of 
how to make technological change endogenous in 
our countries.
The national space is also penetrated by more 
subtle mechanisms such as the exchange rate, which 
generates the problem of “Dutch disease”. Countries 
that specialize in primary production tend to operate 
with overvalued exchange rates, especially if  they are 
also targeted by financial speculation. This problem is 
the main obstacle to industrialization and productive 
transformation and has been studied by Latin 
American economists such as Luiz Carlos Bresser-
Pereira (Bresser-Pereira, 2008 and 2010).
In conclusion, the fact that a country is penetrated 
by external phenomena forms the dilemma of 
development in the global order. If  a country does 
not respond effectively to globalization, it becomes 
disconnected and cannot implement the cumulative 
processes of knowledge management that are inherent 
to the transformation. In contrast, if  it responds 
appropriately, globalization opens up opportunities 
for trade, investment, employment and access to 
new knowledge.
Here we need to reflect briefly on the history of 
the dilemma, to set Prebisch’s contribution in context. 
In the pre-technological-revolution world, before the 
European Renaissance and the takeoff  of western 
Christian civilizations, relations between countries were 
irrelevant from the economic development standpoint. 
International trade existed or a space could be occupied 
and dominated by another country, but production 
conditions remained broadly the same everywhere. As 
technology levels were similar, international relations 
were irrelevant for economic activity.
The dilemma begins when technology impacts 
economic organization and generates continuous 
productivity growth. From then on, the type of relation 
that a given area maintains with the rest of the world 
is fundamental for its development. Consequently, 
the dilemma is at least five centuries old. It started 
in the last decade of  the fifteenth century, when 
Columbus “discovered” the New World, and the 
Portuguese found the sea route to the east, bringing to 
a conclusion the enterprise embarked upon by Prince 
Henry the Navigator at the start of that century. At 
that time, the dilemma arose for two reasons. Firstly, 
there was the first planetary system; and secondly, 
knowledge management —in other words each 
country’s development— is influenced by the nature 
of its international relations.
In the ensuing five centuries, several stages can 
be identified in the formation of the world system and 
the dilemma of development in the global order. A 
first world order was mercantilist capitalism, initially 
led by the Iberian countries and later by France, 
Holland and England. This was the start of western 
and Christian hegemony in the organization of the 
system. In fact, until recently, the domain of technology 
was concentrated in the North Atlantic. 
At the end of  the eighteenth century, the 
Industrial Revolution inaugurated a second world 
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order. New technologies and energy sources, new 
means of  transport, the emergence of  railways, 
undersea cables, telegraph, progress in metallurgy, 
agriculture, industries that we now call traditional, 
such as textiles, which then were dynamic industries, 
formed the new world order and gave an exceptional 
and unprecedented boost to globalization. 
During the conquest and colonization period, 
Latin America joined the global order in a subordinate 
status. The centre-periphery relation, studied by 
Prebisch, became deeper in the second world order 
as our countries gained independence and were 
incorporated into the system as suppliers of primary 
products, importers of  manufactured goods, and 
borrowers. This relationship continued during the 
following three decades (from 1914 to 1945), during 
which there were two world wars, the great crisis of 
the 1930s, the breakdown of the political system with 
the October Revolution in Russia, and the emergence 
of Fascism and Nazism. It is a period in which all 
indicators of globalization —trade, investment and 
financial flows— trended down. Countries turned in 
on themselves, and the crisis of the 1930s also resulted 
in the discrediting of neoclassical orthodoxy and the 
emergence of the Keynesian paradigm. 
This period of “de-globalization” was followed 
by a new third world order. The new technologies gave 
rise to a phenomenal transformation and deepening 
of  globalization networks. It can be divided into 
two subperiods: the first, the golden age of  post-
war recovery under the hegemony of the Keynesian 
paradigm and the welfare state; secondly, the neoliberal 
phase, heavily conditioned by the rapid growth of 
financial globalization and the formation of a giant 
speculative casino. This scenario re-established the 
ideological hegemony of the centre, the magic and 
omnipotence of the market and the supposed impotence 
of public policies subject to the empire of rational 
expectations —a phenomenon that culminated in 
the recent crisis.
How can Prebisch’s thinking be located in this 
historical path of globalization and the transformation 
and permanent renewal of the dilemma of development 
in the global world? Prebisch started his training as 
an economist in the 1920s, in a scenario of apparent 
return to pre-war normalcy, which, culminated in the 
great crisis, the collapse of the international economic 
order, the discrediting of  neoclassical orthodoxy 
and the emergence of the Keynesian paradigm. By 
then, Argentina had achieved the region’s highest 
economic and social indicators, within the centre-
periphery relation prevailing in the second world 
order. Consequently, the crisis hit the Argentine 
economy hard. In that domestic and world scenario) 
being a young man, Prebisch held important posts in 
the Argentine political regime that emerged from the 
coup d’état of  September 1930. In 1935, as general 
manager of  the Central Bank of  the Republic of 
Argentina, he had the unique experience of managing 
monetary policy, and this was to prove decisive for 
the formation of his thinking.
Prebisch was a Professor at the School of 
Economic Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires, 
and he resigned from his chair for the same political 
reasons that caused him to quit the Central Bank in 
the mid-1940s. But, in the first half  of 1948 he took 
up his chair once again, and I had the good fortune 
to be studying the subject at that time. In addition 
to his lecturing responsibilities, Prebisch also led a 
research seminar. I recall that in the first meeting of 
the seminar in April of that year, some 20 people met: 
Prebisch, two or three of his professorial assistants 
and students including myself. The professor started 
by explaining the problems he had encountered 
in managing monetary policy and he said: “My 
disenchantment with orthodox theory grew and 
grew.” He then asked: “What do you think was the 
reason for this disenchantment? “ I was bold enough 
to venture an answer, with which the Professor agreed: 
the reason was that theory did not help to resolve the 
problems. In that seminar, and on the course, Prebisch 
foreshadowed the ideas he would later deploy here 
in eclac, enhanced by the contribution of  Celso 
Furtado, Aníbal Pinto and other masters of Latin 
American economic thought.
Set in their historical context, it can be seen 
that Prebisch’s ideas and so-called Latin American 
structuralism developed during the phase of  de-
globalization of the international system, and achieved 
their greatest influence in the golden age of the third 
world order —when the orthodoxy of  the centre 
and its hegemonic pretensions were being replaced 
by the Keynesian paradigm, public policies and the 
welfare state. 
It was against that backdrop that Prebisch’s 
thinking and his response to the dilemma of 
development in the global world bear fruit in Latin 
America and have a major influence on the economic 
policy of the region’s countries. Starting in the 1970s, 
however, while Prebisch was still alive, things changed, 
and the hegemonic thought of the centre was restored, 
intensively penetrated by the financial dimension. To 
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a greater or lesser extent, our countries succumbed 
to the new situation, often in scenarios of extreme 
political tension. The transformation process, led 
by import-substituting industrialization, had not 
allowed us to construct sufficiently solid national 
situations. Consequently, we fell into the debt trap 
and, ultimately, the lost decade of the 1980s. These 
were the final years of Prebisch’s life, in which his 
influence on theory and the economic policy of Latin 
American countries waned. 
IV
The last 25 years
Profound changes have occurred since 1985, which 
need to be kept in mind when considering the currency 
of Prebisch’s thinking. The most far-reaching event 
has been the consolidation of development in China 
and the emergence of  India. Since the end of  the 
Second World War, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and Chinese Taipei have all furthered their industrial 
and technological development. Nonetheless, those 
countries jointly represent just 5% of  the world’s 
population. Now with the emergence of  the two 
great Asian nations accounting for 40% of  the 
world population, an alternative development pole 
is emerging and bringing to an end the indisputable 
western hegemony of the last five centuries. What 
specifically characterizes the emergence of these Asian 
nations is the structural transformation based on 
the incorporation of knowledge-intensive activities 
in their productive and social fabrics. The dynamic 
centre of  the system has started to shift from the 
North Atlantic to the Asia Pacific basin.
At the same time, the world economy has been 
shaken by the collapse of the money markets; and 
it has become clear that maintaining the saving and 
international payments deficit of the United States 
as a way to bridge the saving-investment gap in the 
global economy is unviable. The insufficiency of 
domestic demand in certain countries (mainly China 
and Germany) to absorb their high levels of saving, has 
been covered largely by the North American deficit.
A further relevant fact is that the crisis in the 
world of money has generated a theoretical vacuum 
in centrist thinking. As in the 1930s, orthodoxy has 
been discredited because of its inability to generate 
an international framework and national policies that 
were viable. Argentina has to some extent played a 
pioneering role in certain problems. We noted earlier 
that Prebisch’s thinking was founded on Argentine 
experience in the interwar period. More recently, 
Argentina has been the Latin American country 
that applied the neoliberal creed in greatest depth. 
It progressed further than any other country in the 
region in terms of privatization; it borrowed up to the 
limit of insolvency; overvalued its currency causing 
harm to the productive fabric; turned the central bank 
into an exchange house under the currency-board and 
fixed-exchange-rate regime; and reduced the goal of 
economic policy to “transmitting friendly signals to 
markets.” The epilogue was the collapse in 2001-2002. 
This Argentine experience foreshadowed the crisis 
that erupted in the global system at the end of this 
decade, based on the same ideas and policies that 
inspired the neoliberal strategy in my country.
These changes in the global system raise questions 
about the resolution of the saving-investment gap, 
the United States deficit, the regulation of money 
markets and how to accommodate the emerging Asian 
countries into a new international scenario. What we 
have not seen are responses from the international 
system to address the challenges that continue to 
threaten peace, security and the environment. The 
debate in the Group of 20 and other international 
forums does not provide valid responses to these 
questions, let alone to the widening gaps in well-being 
in the global system and within most countries. 
In this scenario of uncertainties, some things 
clearly do not change. The nature of globalization 
and development do not change, nor do relations 
between the two and the dilemma of development 
in the global world. 
The presence of China in today’s globalised world 
does not mean that is behaving differently towards 
the least advanced economies than mature industrial 
nations —that is, by exporting complex manufactures 
and capital and importing food and raw materials. 
It is predictable that the international division of 
labour between the old centre of the North Atlantic 
and the new Asia-Pacific centre, on the one hand, and 
what remains of the periphery following the takeoff 
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of emerging nations, on the other, will maintain the 
same trends as in the past. 
At the same time, economic development is facing 
challenges caused by major changes in the world 
system and the continuous expansion of knowledge 
and technology frontiers. But development remains 
essentially what it always was, the incorporation of 
science and technology into the economic and social 




This brings me to my final reflections on the dilemma 
of development in the global world and the conditions 
that determine the capacity of countries to respond 
to the challenges and opportunities of globalization. 
The comparative analysis of  the experience of 
countries that have had success in various historical 
periods, responding effectively to those challenges and 
opportunities, reveals the presence of certain necessary 
conditions which, I collectively refer to as “national 
density”. It can be argued that each country has the 
globalization it deserves, in relation to the strength 
of its national density. Countries with strong national 
density are capable of responding to the challenges 
and can take advantage of the opportunities provided 
by the global system. 
The components of  national density include, 
first and foremost, social cohesion. Societies that 
are deeply fragmented by inequality, and sometimes 
by religious and ethnic problems, lack the capacity 
to exploit their resource potential. The second 
component is the quality of  leadership. In socially 
cohesive societies, leaders normally have strategies for 
accumulating power within the national space, and are 
not merely the commissioned agents of transnational 
interests. For example, in contemporary history, the 
experience of  the emerging countries of  Asia shows 
that local entrepreneurs and national Governments 
lead the process of  capital and technology and 
accumulation. They also forge relationships with 
transnational corporations to develop value chains, 
without losing the capacity to conduct processes of 
accumulation and change. These two conditions are 
mutually linked. Highly fragmented societies tend to 
be led by minorities that are closer to transnational 
interests than the interests of  their own people. 
A third component of  national density is long-
term institutional stability, irrespective of the nature of 
the political regime. A sufficient degree of institutional 
stability is needed to be able to articulate responses 
to the dilemma. The fourth component consists of 
ideas. None of  the successful countries conducted 
their national policies with the hegemonic vision of 
centre. All of  them, including the emerging United 
States in the nineteenth century, always operated 
with ideas rooted in their national interest. This was 
true of  Japan following the Meiji restoration and it 
happened after World War II in the heterodox ideas 
and policies of  the Republic of  Korea, Chinese 
Taipei, China and India. As Prebisch argued, the 
existence of  sui generis thinking is a necessary and 
essential condition for a country to enter the path 
of  development. 
After two centuries of  independence, Latin 
America is struggling with the weak national density 
of our countries. Our societies are based on social 
fragmentation, the domination of native population 
and the subsequent extraordinary phenomenon of 
slavery that characterized much of Latin America. In 
countries like Argentina, where the original peoples 
and Afro-Americans were rendered as a minority 
in the total population after the tidal wave of 
immigration, social fragmentation is reflected in the 
concentration of land ownership and other natural 
resources. The fact that Latin America is the region 
with the highest concentration of wealth and the most 
unequal distribution of income is largely a legacy 
of history. Our challenge in resolving the dilemma 
of development in the global world is greater than 
elsewhere, because here we have to respond to the 
problems of today and, simultaneously, repair the 
consequences of history.
Social fragmentation has had its corollary in 
long-term political instability and the existence 
of  leaderships with power strategies linked to the 
hegemonic centre, serving as agents of transnational 
interests rather than leaders of endogenous, national 
processes of accumulation. The same reasons also 
explain why ideas subordinated to centrist thinking have 
14
RAúL PREbISCh And ThE dILEmmA of dEVELoPmEnT In ThE GLobALISEd WoRLd  •  ALdo fERRER
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 0
prevailed, to a greater or lesser extent depending on 
the countries and historical periods in each case. 
After two centuries of independence, national 
density still needs to be constructed. The latest eclac 
report on inequality, social integration and inclusion 
highlights an essential condition for the development 
process in Latin America. Prebisch had stressed the 
same in his studies on peripheral capitalism and 
even earlier. 
To resolve the dilemma of development in the 
global world, it is necessary to enrich our countries’ 
national density in terms of social inclusion, leadership 
quality, democratic stability, and the consolidation 
of critical thought that flourishes, not because there 
is a hegemonic vacuum in the centre, but because we 
are capable of constructing original Latin American 
economic and social development thinking. All of this, 
to deploy effective development policies that include 
stability and sound macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Raúl Prebisch always emphasized this, sometimes to 
the disbelief  of some of his disciples. It is impossible 
to base national policies on a framework of disorder; 
fiscal solvency is essential, as also are low levels of 
indebtedness and sound international payments. If  
there is insufficient capacity in the sovereign exercise 
of economic policy, no transformation is possible; and 
national density is necessary to be able to implement 
policies founded in the national interest. 
The neoliberalism vernacular, epigone of 
the hegemonic thinking of the centre, sees us as a 
segment of the world market and condemns us, as 
Helio Jaguaribe (1979) argues, to a peripheral status. 
The globalizing fundamentalism that contaminated 
Latin America has caused, in some expressions of 
progressivism, a degree of resignation in the sense 
that globalization is so overwhelming that the only 
thing we can do is seek a few niches to accommodate 
ourselves. That was not Prebisch’s message. There 
is no niche that enables us to generate development 
and social inclusion. The only way forward is to 
definitively break with the centre-periphery relation, 
generating capacity to make use of our resources and 
imagination and deploy a new style of engagement 
in the world system. 
What, then, is the answer the question that 
I formulated initially? What validity do the three 
main messages of Prebisch have today? The answer 
is, even more than when he formulated them over 
50 years ago with the collaboration of  his young 
working colleagues in eclac. The first message, the 
crucial importance of critical thinking, is more valid 
today than it was at the time. Secondly, the fact that 
transformation is possible is verified by experience in 
other parts of the world. Prebisch transmits a message 
of hope. We have the means, capacity, resources, and 
the talent needed to construct development. There 
are no external factors that paralyze us and prevent 
it. The message of  transformation and hope is as 
alive today as it was then. Lastly, the third message, 
that development is impossible without a profound 
structural change that incorporates activities on the 
frontier of  knowledge seems ratified by historical 
experience and comparative development studies, 
particularly of  emerging Asian countries. That 
transformation includes the issue addresses in the 
latest eclac report (2010) on the takeoff of small 
and medium-sized enterprises; their links with large 
value chains; the ties between science and technology 
systems and production; education and synergy 
between the public and private domains. 
Lastly, Latin American density: the dimensions of 
national density are also valid at the regional level. The 
stronger our national densities, the deeper will be the 
links between our countries, infrastructure investments, 
the formation of value chains in dynamic sectors of 
regional scope, science and technology programmes, 
development financing; and more solid will be the 
institutions of integration capable of implementing 
community policies and integrating national processes 
within a broader continental space. 
To construct Latin American density we must 
generate our own ideas on integration, develop 
appropriate visions of  our realities, and abandon 
the fantasy of  reproducing the experience of  the 
European Union in the Latin American space. Our 
reality is different, the integration of our countries 
is different from that of other regional spaces. We 
have made significant progress in this area, probably 
more in the field of politics and coordination of Latin 
American diplomacy than in the economic development 
sphere. Latin American density is also based on social 
development, the quality of leadership, democratic 
consultation and critical thinking. 
To conclude, 25 years after the Raúl Prebisch’s 
death, his fundamental ideas, developed initially in 
Argentina and then propagated from eclac to the rest 
of the world, with collaboration from his professional 
colleagues, are more relevant today than ever.
(Original: Spanish)
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